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THE FALLACY OF CONTRACT IN SEXUAL
SLAVERY: A RESPONSE TO RAMSEYER’S
“CONTRACTING FOR SEX IN THE PACIFIC
WAR”
Yong-Shik Lee, * Natsu Taylor Saito, ** Jonathan Todres ***

I. Introduction
Over seven decades have passed since the Second World War but, despite the passage of time, the trauma from the most destructive war in history remains and controversies over the extent and even the existence of some
of the cruelest war crimes, such as sexual slavery enforced by Japan, continue with attempts to rewrite history and to exonerate those who engaged in
war crimes. The latest such attempt is a troubling recharacterization of the
Japanese war crime of sexual slavery as a legitimate contractual arrangement. A recent paper authored by J. Mark Ramseyer (hereinafter “the author”), entitled Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War, mischaracterizes
sexual slavery as a contractual process by which the victims freely participated in prostitution in return for a substantial reward, denying the responsibility of the Japanese government and its military for the atrocious human
1
rights violations committed.
Ramseyer’s article is flawed and lacks factual foundation. Its primary
point is that the Japanese government or military was not responsible for the
2
recruitment or management of “comfort women” but rather that private

*
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law and Director
and Professorial Fellow, The Law and Development Institute. I am grateful to distinguished
colleagues, including Professors Noah Feldman (Harvard Law School), Alexis Dudden (University of Connecticut), Frank Upham (New York University School of Law), and Albert
Choi (University of Michigan Law School), for insightful comments and advice. I am also
thankful to research assistants, including Andrew Smith, Kelly McGrath, and Thomas Oliver
Flint, J.D. candidates at Georgia State University College of Law, for research and editorial
assistance.
**
Distinguished University Professor & Professor of Law, Georgia State University
College of Law.
***
Distinguished University Professor & Professor of Law, Georgia State University
College of Law. We would like to express our heartfelt appreciation to the editors of the
Michigan Journal of International Law, who not only provided excellent editorial assistance
but also brought our article to print on an expedited timeframe.
1.
J. Mark Ramseyer, Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War, 65 INT’L REV L. &
ECON. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2020.105971
[https://perma.cc/D78P-UG8W].
2.
The term “comfort women” was “a euphemism for women who provided sexual
services to Japanese Imperial Army troops during Japan’s militaristic period that ended with
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parties made the arrangements through voluntary contracts with the recruits
or their parents. As such, the author claims, problems with the recruitment
or treatment, if any, should be attributed to cheating brothel owners, which
the author contends occur in any industry, or dishonest Korean recruiters
3
who deployed deceitful recruitment tactics. The author adds:
Note, however, what this problem was not. It was not that the government, either the Korean or the Japanese government, forced
women into prostitution. It was not that the Japanese army worked
with fraudulent recruiters. It was not even that recruiters focused on
the army’s comfort stations. Instead, the problem involved domestic Korean recruiters who had been tricking young women into
4
working at brothels for decades.
This is flatly untrue; an abundance of evidence, including numerous tes5
6
timonies and the findings of scholars, NGOs, and intergovernmental or7
ganizations, affirms that the victims were coerced, deceived, or otherwise
World War II and who generally lived under conditions of sexual slavery.” Ami Lynch, Comfort Women, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/comfort-women (last visited
Mar. 11, 2021).
3.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6.
4.
Id. at 5.
5.
See, e.g., GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN’S BRUTAL REGIME OF
ENFORCED PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995); YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI,
COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY DURING WORLD WAR II
(Suzanne O’Brien trans., 2000); YUKI TANAKA, JAPAN’S COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL
SLAVERY AND PROSTITUTION DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE US OCCUPATION (2002); C.
SARAH SOH, THE COMFORT WOMEN (2008); CAROLINE NORMA, THE JAPANESE COMFORT
WOMEN AND SEXUAL SLAVERY DURING THE CHINA AND PACIFIC WARS (2016).
6.
Ustinia Dolgopol & Snehal Paranjape, Int’l Comm. Jurists, Comfort Women: An
Unfinished Ordeal (1994) [hereinafter “ICJ Report”]; Amnesty Int’l, Still Waiting After 60
Years, Justice for Survivors of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery System, Al Index ASA 22/012
/2005 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter “Amnesty International Report”].
7.
Radhika Coomaraswamy (Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its
Causes and Consequences), Report on the Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime,
4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter “Coomaraswamy Report”];
Gay J. McDougall (Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Systemic Rape and Sexual Slavery
Practices), Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like
Practices during Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) [hereinafter “McDougall Report”]. There have been critiques about selected portions of the Coomaraswamy Report. See, e.g., Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Comfort Women: Beyond Litigious
Feminism, 58 MONUMENTA NIPPONCIA, 222, 232 (2003) (discussing the controversy around
the story of Seiji Yoshida which was retracted). The Coomaraswamy Report also introduces
critiques of the Yoshida story, such as one provided by a Japanese scholar (Dr. Ikuhiko Hata).
Coomaraswamy Report, at 7. The Coomaraswamy Report is broadly accepted and cited by
other studies, such as the 2005 Amnesty International Report. A prior report by the International Commission of Jurists, based in Geneva, Switzerland, also corroborates the account of
the Coomaraswamy Report. ICJ Report, supra note 6. The U.S. Congress also supported the
U.N. Report by urging the Japanese government to follow the recommendations of the United
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manipulated into sexual servitude under the direct or indirect involvement
8
of the Japanese government or the military. The Japanese government conducted its own study and issued a statement (“Kono Statement”) through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, acknowledging the following:
The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in
the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the
transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women
was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response
to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed
that in many cases they were recruited against their own will,
through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative
/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They
lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere
9
[emphasis added].
The Ramseyer article never mentions the Kono statement. The Japanese
government also established strict regulations for the so-called “comfort stations” (perhaps more appropriately, hereinafter referred to as “forced sex
stations”) which, according to the report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences (“the Coomaraswamy Report”), “reveal beyond doubt the extent to which the Japanese
Nations and Amnesty International with respect to comfort women. H.R. 121, 110th Cong.
(2007).
8.
The Coomaraswamy Report acknowledges that women and girls who were already
sex workers were also recruited. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5.
9.
Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study on
the Issue of “Comfort Women,” MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFS. JAPAN (Aug. 4, 1993) [hereinafter
“Kono Statement”], https://web.archive.org/web/20140709022903/http://www.mofa.go.jp
/policy/women/fund/state9308.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (archived English translation of
the statement). Prior to the Kono Statement, the Japanese government had issued a statement
in August 1992 that admitted, for the first time, deception, coercion and official involvement
in the recruitment of comfort women. HICKS, supra note 5, at 238. Coercion and deception in
the recruitment of so-called comfort women by the Japanese government and military is a
well-established historical fact. See supra note 5 (listing academic works affirming the fact).
Reflecting this consensus, in 2016, fifteen associations of history scholars and educators in
Japan issued a joint statement and clarified in relevant part, “Historical research has unequivocally established that the Japanese government and army proposed, established, managed,
and regulated “comfort stations” at military facilities, and that the “comfort women” system
was essentially a system of sexual slavery that violated existing domestic and international
legal standards.” Hist. Sci. Soc’y Japan, A Joint Statement by Japanese Historians and History Educators on the “Comfort Women” Issue, J. HIST. STUD. (May 30, 2016), http://rekiken.jp
/english/appeals/appeal_20160530.html [https://perma.cc/88PQ-H586]. A year before, in
2015, twenty U.S.-based history professors had also issued a statement and publicly objected
to the attempts by the Japanese government to suppress statements in history textbooks both
in Japan and elsewhere about “comfort women” which these scholars referred to as “a brutal
system of sexual exploitation in the service of the Japanese imperial army during World War
II.” Alexis Dudden, Letter to the Editor, Standing with Historians of Japan, PERSP.
ON HISTORY (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories
/perspectives-on-history/march-2015/letter-to-the-editor-standing-with-historians-of-japan.
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forces took direct responsibility for the comfort stations and were intimately
connected with all aspects of their organization, but they also clearly indicate how legitimized and established an institution the stations had be10
come.”
The author never discusses any of this evidence or any other materials
11
weighing against his argument. As the Japanese government admitted in
12
the Kono Statement, sexual servitude was not the outcome of voluntary
transactions under a private contractual process, but rather it proceeded under the direct or indirect involvement of the Japanese military in the recruitment and management of the victims who were kept under horrendous
conditions that included the deprivation of their freedom, dignity, health,
13
and life as human beings. For all or most of the victims, there was never a
14
legitimate contract but only coercion, deceit, and torture – hence justifying
15
the use of term “sexual slavery” – and there were no contractual dynamics
for the forced or deceived victims, notwithstanding the contentions of the
16
author.
17
Reports commissioned by the United Nations, investigative reports of
18
the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International, and a
10.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4.
11.
For another significant example, in 1998 the Shimonoseki Branch of the Yamaguchi District Court ruled that the comfort women system was outright discrimination based upon gender and ethnicity and that the system violated fundamental human rights guaranteed by
Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution. Chin Kim & Stanley S. Kim, Delayed Justice: The
Case of the Japanese Imperial Military Sex Slaves, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 263, 263–64
(1998). This ruling is significant because the Japanese court affirmed the illegal nature of
military sexual slavery. The court’s compensation order, but not the cited finding of the court,
was reversed by the higher courts on appeal.
12.
Kono Statement, supra note 9.
13.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 48–50; Amnesty
International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13; Christine Chinkin, Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 335, 337 (2001).
14.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7; ICJ Report, supra note 6; McDougall Report, supra note 7.
15.
See also Carmen M. Argibay, Sexual Slavery and the Comfort Women of World, 21
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 386–87 (2003) (discussing why the Japanese “comfort system”
was a form of sexual slavery).
16.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1. A group of scholars have issued a joint statement and
pointed out that “Ramseyer produces no evidence of any signed contracts for work at ‘comfort
stations.’” Amy Stanley, Hannah Shepherd, Sayaka Chatani, David Ambaras, & Chelsea
Szendi Schieder, “Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War”: The Case for Retraction on
Grounds of Academic Misconduct, ASIA-PACIFIC J., (Feb. 18, 2021), https://sites.google.com
/view/concernedhistorians (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). In addition, two Harvard history professors, Carter Eckert and Andrew Gordon, have also concluded that Ramseyer fails to cite
any evidence for contracts that he claims existed. Ki-weon Cho, Harvard History Professors
Condemn Ramseyer’s Paper for Lacking “Scholarly Integrity,” HANKYOREH (Feb. 19, 2021),
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/983742.html.
17.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7; McDougall Report, supra note 7.
18.
ICJ Report, supra note 6; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6.
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number of academic works offer detailed accounts of the sexual slavery at
19
issue. These reports and studies draw on numerous sources including tes20
timonials of survivors and ex-soldiers, accounts of various scholars, documentary evidence, and positions of the governments of South and North
21
Korea as well as Japan. Given the evidence, we believe that the author’s
attempt to apply the concept of a contract to justify inhumane and life22
threatening sexual slavery (many of the victims lost their lives ) is grossly
misplaced. A contract analysis has no place, not only in cases of sexual
slavery but also in many instances of prewar recruitment of prostitutes
where young girls were sent to brothels without having any chance to make
the free, informed decision that constitutes a core element of contract for23
mation. There is no legitimate contract where a party is coerced, deceived,
or otherwise manipulated into sexual servitude.
With this understanding, this article discusses the critical flaws in the
arguments advanced by Ramseyer, the traumatic impact of such arguments
on survivors of these war crimes and many others who share their pain, and

19.
See supra note 6.
20.
The Coomaraswamy Report acknowledges that “[n]early all evidence concerning
the recruitment of ‘comfort women’ comes from the oral testimony of the victims themselves.” Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4. The Report also observes that the absence
of official documents concerning the actual recruitment process “made it easy for many to
reject the testimonies of the victims as anecdotal or even created to implicate the Government
in a matter which was essentially a private and, therefore, a privately run, system of prostitution.” Id. at 4. However, the consistency of the accounts of women from different parts of
Asia of the manner in which they were recruited and the clear involvement of the military and
government at different levels is indisputable. Id. In 2017, documentary evidence, which
demonstrates the direct involvement of the Japanese military in the recruitment, was reported:
A 1938 Japanese police report recorded the “kidnapping” of women to be sent to “comfort
stations” in Shanghai, China. 1 GOV’T JAPAN, COMPILATION OF HISTORICAL MATERIALS ON
MILITARY COMFORT WOMEN 27 (March 24, 1997), cited in Seon Yoon Hwang, Japanese
Imperial Police Report Expresses the Recruitment of Comfort Women as Kidnapping,
JOONGANG NEWSPAPER (Aug. 13, 2017), https://news.joins.com/article/21839947.
21.
Japan’s demands that the United Nations amend the Report in 2014 were rejected.
Ankit Panda, Japan Denied Revision of UN Comfort Women Report, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 7,
2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japan-denied-revision-of-un-comfort-women-report/.
22.
Many victims of sexual slavery were killed by the retreating Japanese troops. In
Micronesia, for example, the Japanese army killed seventy of them in one night, because they
felt the women would be an encumbrance or an embarrassment were they to be captured by
the advancing American troops. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4. In another shameful episode during the last phase of the war, a Japanese military officer had a sergeant throw
two hand-grenades into a dugout late at night, while comfort women slept, fearing that they
might not commit suicide before capture by the Allied forces. HICKS, supra note 5, at 135; see
also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 15. According to one estimate, ninety percent of “comfort
women” did not survive the war. Erin Blakemore, The Brutal History of Japan’s Comfort
Women, HISTORY (updated Jul. 21, 2019, original Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.history.com
/news/comfort-women-japan-military-brothels-korea [https://perma.cc/W23J-4BJU].
23.
For a discussion of contract formation, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
3–41 (4th ed. 2004). In many jurisdictions, including Japan, one may not bind minors under a
contract, and a contract is voidable at the election of the minor. Id. at 222.

296

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 42:291

the broader implications of these and other similar justifications for sexual
exploitation. Ultimately, we argue that the author’s contractual approach is
both misplaced in circumstances in which one party cannot freely decide
their actions, as was the case here, and deeply inappropriate as applied to
gross human rights violations such as sexual slavery.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the irrelevance of prewar prostitution and refutes the attempt to justify wartime sexual slavery as
a continuation of a legitimate sex industry. Part III examines the brutality of
the forced sex stations. The Ramseyer article describes these stations, located throughout the Japanese frontlines, as agreeable places for business
24
where willing sex workers earned high-level income. On the contrary, the
conditions of these stations were brutal and miserable, as aptly observed by
the Kono Statement and many other reports and studies; mistreatment, rape,
25
other forms of torture, and even killings routinely took place. Part IV discusses the fallacy of the contract arguments advanced by the author where a
legitimate contract could not have been made due to coercion, deception,
and the prohibitively high cost of compensating for the extreme dangers on
the frontlines of the intensifying war. Part V considers the broader human
rights implications of the exploitation of “comfort women” and discusses
the more recent response of the Japanese government. Finally, in Part VI,
the article concludes by addressing the importance of correcting these inaccuracies, both to reaffirm the dignity of survivors of sexual servitude and to
ensure broader accountability for human rights violations.

II. Irrelevance of “Prewar Prostitution”
A. Flawed Presumptions
Ramseyer contends that prostitution existed in prewar Japan and Korea,
and that military sexual service was a continuation of the prevailing practices but required greater rewards due to the heightened danger and uncertainty
of the war. The author notes:
Comfort stations operated as the overseas military analogue to the
private brothels in Japan and Korea. Whether in Japan or in Korea,
brothels hired, and women looked for work. The work at stake in
these transactions involved sexual services, but the economic logic
to the arrangements that the two parties – brothel and prostitute –
negotiated reflected the resources and alternative opportunities that
26
both sides understood each other to hold.

24.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 5–7.
25.
Kono Statement, supra note 9; Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6–12; ICJ
Report, supra note 6, at 15; see also Blakemore, supra note 22.
26.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2.
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Characterizing the “comfort stations” as a military analogue to private
brothels, the author incorrectly presumes that the recruits were freely participating in negotiation of the terms of overseas sexual services for the military. It is doubtful that the process of recruitment for private brothels was an
entirely legitimate contractual process, as we further discuss in Part IV, but
regardless of the practices in private brothels, the recruitment for military
sexual servitude, rampant with coercion, deception, and manipulation directly or indirectly supported by public authorities, was not a legitimate contractual process where economic logic could prevail.
The Coomaraswamy Report recounts the widespread use of coercion
and deceit in the process of recruitment:
As the war continued and the number of Japanese soldiers based in
various parts of East Asia increased, the demand for military sexual
slaves increased, so that new methods of recruitment were created.
This involved the increased use of deception and force in many
parts of East Asia, and especially in Korea. The testimonies of
many Korean “comfort women” who have come forward reveals
the frequency with which coercion or duplicity was employed: a
considerable number of (mostly Korean) women victims speak in
their testimonies of the deceit and pretence which were employed
by the various agents or local collaborators who had been responsi27
ble for their recruitment.
Ramseyer contends that the Japanese military did not require additional
28
prostitutes as prostitutes had followed armies everywhere. On the contrary,
however, scholars have estimated that the Japanese military recruited
29
100,000 to 200,000 military sex slaves over the course of the entire war,
30
mainly from Korea (mostly fourteen to eighteen years of age). Scholars
31
disagree on the precise number, but it is not difficult to see that the mili27.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6–12. Other scholars also affirm that the
women were for the most part duped, abducted or coerced into sexual slavery. See, e.g.,
HICKS, supra note 5, at 18.
28.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 5. This is refuted by C. Sarah Soh, who states, “It is important to note at the outset that the majority of the former Korean ‘military comfort women’
(chonggun wianbu in Korean, jugun ianfu in Japanese) were systematically and often coercively recruited by the Japanese forces under the banner of Chongsindae (“Voluntary” Labor
Service Corps). They were not camp-following prostitutes, as the euphemistic phrase ‘military
comfort women’ might suggest.” Chunghee Sarah Soh, The Korean “Comfort Women”:
Movement for Redress, 36 ASIAN SURVEY 1226, 1227 (1996).
29.
BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA’S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 155 (1997);
SOH, supra note 5, at 15; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7.
30.
SOH, supra note 5, at 15; NORMA, supra note 5, at 131.
31.
For example, Yoshimi Yoshiaki estimates that from 50,000 to 200,000 women
were enslaved. YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 93. Yuki Tanaka suggests from 80,000 to 100,000.
TANAKA, supra note 5, at 31. Zhiliang Su estimates from 360,000 to 410,000. Number of
Comfort Stations and Comfort Women, ASIAN WOMEN’S F., https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts07.html [https://perma.cc/W38F-BP7W].
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tary’s demand for sexual servitude would have far exceeded what it could
have recruited from willing individuals.
The Japanese military wanted to make sexual services available to its
troops on frontlines where soldiers were experiencing extreme battle
32
stress. Field officers made special requests for the recruitment and trans33
portation of comfort women. Given the intensity of the war and the extreme danger evidenced by high levels of casualties, finding individuals
willing to risk their lives to offer sexual services to frontline soldiers would
have been an extreme challenge. As the survivor testimonies discussed below indicate, these women did not willingly agree to go to the frontlines.
The recruitment process could not have been a contractual process freely
34
entered into; coercion and deceit were necessary. Japan turned to its colonies, such as Korea, for recruitment. In addition to the practical difficulties
of recruitment, the Japanese government did not want to hurt morale within
the Japanese military by forcing Japanese women into sexual slavery at
“comfort stations,” as it would upset the soldiers to see “Japanese women,
35
even relatives, conscripted into the comfort women system.”
The level of force and deceit employed increased over time; recruitment
occurred through large-scale coercion and violent abduction of women in
36
what amounted to slave raids in countries under Japanese control. As for
deception, private operators working for the military would come to the villages and deceive girls with the promise of well-paid work, including in res37
taurants or as cooks or cleaners for the military. According to a U.S. Office of War Interrogation Report, Korean women assumed that comfort
service consisted of visiting wounded soldiers and making the soldiers happy, and many Korean women enlisted without knowing that they would be
38
required to offer sexual services. In this deceitful process, not only Korean
recruiters but agents of the state, such as police and other local authorities,

32.
Reflecting these tensions, there had been a high incidence of rape by Japanese
troops in China and, in response, a number of Korean women from a Korean community in
Japan were sent by the Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture to assuage troops in the province.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5.
33.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences (Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy) acquired photocopies of original orders containing special requests made by field officers for the recruitment and transportation of comfort women. Id. at 15.
34.
See YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 112–27.
35.
THOMAS J. WARD & WILLIAM D. LAY, PARK STATUE POLITICS: WORLD WAR II
COMFORT WOMEN MEMORIALS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2019); see also NORMA, supra
note 5, at 132.
36.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at
135-137; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 8–9; Argibay, supra note 15, at 377–
99.
37.
Id.; see also TANAKA, supra note 5, at 38.
38.
YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 105–06.

Winter 2021]

The Fallacy of Contract in Sexual Slavery

299

39

were also involved. Deception often accompanied coercion: The police
would arrive in a village recruiting for the “Women’s Voluntary Service
Corps,” using the pretext of deploying the recruited women in “war efforts”
40
but instead sending them for military sexual service. If the girls recommended as “volunteers” failed to appear, the military police would interro41
gate their reasons for non-compliance, creating a coercive environment.
The outcome of this deception was particularly cruel to young Korean
girls. Many of them did not question the good employment opportunities
offered to them with assurances from trusted figures such as village authorities, schoolteachers, and police, and in many cases, due to their young age
and innocence, they did not even have an understanding of prostitution or
42
sex. Ramseyer argues that such trickery would not have worked because
the women and girls would have reported what happened. He states:
. . . it makes implausible any notion that they had been tricked by
duplicitous recruiters. Trickery works when the target audience
does not know what is at stake. When young women (or girls) from
small, closed communities leave for several years and then return,
they report what happened. Word travels, and others in the commu43
nity learn what the trip entails.
We do not know how many of those women were able to return before the
war ended, but even if some returned, the stigma caused by forced sex
would have inhibited returning women from reporting their experiences and
warning other girls of the danger. This was particularly true in Korean culture where losing one’s virginity meant a young woman would have substantial difficulty in marrying and having a family should her experiences
become known. Thus, most of the survivors were concerned principally
with hiding their experiences and reintegrating into society, although, the
deception eventually became known to more people.
As the war intensified and suspicion grew among the population, the
military resorted to undisguised violence, as families resisted calls to recruit
young women for the military sexual slavery. The level of violence and coercion became extreme; a large number of survivors offered testimonials on
39.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report,
supra note 6, at 8–9.
40.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report,
supra note 6, at 8–9.
41.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report,
supra note 6, at 8–9.
42.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; see also Amnesty International Report,
supra note 6, at 8–9.
43.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 4. However, in 1932, fifteen Japanese women were deceived about the terms of their employment by private entrepreneurs and trafficked from Nagasaki to a Japanese Naval “comfort station” in Shanghai, China. Alexis Dudden, A Brief Response to J. Mark Ramseyer’s “Contracting for Sex,” 65 INT’L REV L. & ECON. (forthcoming
2021).
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violence used on family members who tried to resist the abduction of their
44
daughters. Young women were, in some cases, raped by soldiers in front
45
of their parents before being forcibly removed. The following testimony,
offered by So Gyun Hwang, recollects a cruel incident of deception and violence during and following her recruitment:
I was born on 28 November 1918 as the second daughter of a day
labourer. We lived in the Taeri Workers’ District, Kangdong County, Pyongyang City.
When I was 17 years old, in 1936, the head of our village came to
our house and promised me to help me find a job in a factory. Because my family was so poor, I gladly accepted this offer of a wellpaid job. I was taken to the railway station in a Japanese truck
where 20 or so other Korean girls were already waiting. We were
put on the train, then onto a truck and after a few days’ travel we
reached a big house at the River Mudinjian in China. I thought it
was the factory, but I realized that there was no factory. Each girl
was assigned one small room with a straw bag to sleep on, with a
number on each door.
After two days of waiting, without knowing what was happening to
me, a Japanese soldier in army uniform, wearing a sword, came to
my room. He asked me ‘will you obey my words or not?’, then
pulled my hair, put me on the floor and asked me to open my legs.
He raped me. When he left, I saw there were 20 or 30 more men
waiting outside. They all raped me that day. From then on, every
night I was assaulted by 15 to 20 men.
We had to undergo medical examinations regularly. Those who
were found disease-stricken were killed and buried in unknown
places. One day, a new girl was put in the compartment next to me.
She tried to resist the men and bit one of them in his arm. She was
then taken to the courtyard and in front of all of us, her head was
46
cut off with a sword and her body was cut into small pieces.
The ICJ report introduces the following statement from the Philippines regarding another victim, Francisca Austari, aged seventy at the time of the
investigation, demonstrating a similar pattern of coercion:
Ms. Austari was born in Santa Cruz, Laguna, on 2 December 1923.
She was the eldest child in her family; her father was a tenant
farmer and because of the family’s economic circumstances she
was only able to attend school from first to third grade.
44.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 3; see also Amnesty International Report,
supra note 6, at 9.
45.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7.
46.
Id. at 10.
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Sometime in 1941, a Filipino approached Ms. Austari while she
and some other girls were washing clothes by a river bank. She
heard the other women scream out “the Japanese are coming”; they
all began to run but she was too slow and a Filipino man grabbed
her. He told her she was going to go and wash clothes for the Japanese soldiers who were camped in the nearby town. Japanese soldiers were present when this occurred. For the first three months
that she was at the encampment. Ms. Austari did wash clothes and
was told by the Filipino (referred to by Filipinos as a Makapili,
which denotes someone who collaborated with the Japanese or is a
supporter of the Japanese) that money was being given to her
mother for her work. He said that the money being given to her
mother came from the Japanese but was handed over by him.
After about three months she was told that no more money would
be forthcoming; at this point she refused to wash clothes any longer. Following this the Japanese soldiers took her inside the barracks
and raped her. That night five or six Japanese soldiers, one after the
other, had forcible intercourse with her. She attempted to resist
their attacks on her and was beaten by the soldiers. At various times
in the month that followed she would try to close her legs and prevent the Japanese from having intercourse with her. Each time that
this happened she was hit and the soldiers would pound on her, particularly her legs, and force her to have intercourse. When questioned about the manner in which intercourse occurred, Ms. Austari
indicated that she was forced to have intercourse in different positions with the Japanese, although most commonly she was forced to
have her legs raised in the air.
This occurred each night for the next two or three months. She was
the only woman in the military camp and was kept inside a room;
she was not allowed to go out and was accompanied by a guard
when she went to the toilet. Each night soldiers, sometimes two,
sometimes five, would come to her room already naked and have
47
forcible intercourse.
Both survivor testimonies and the other evidence of sexual slavery make
clear that recharacterizing this systemic exploitation as contractual arrangements freely entered into is both deeply troubling and inconsistent with
what actually occurred.

47.
ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 56–57. For further evidence, see, for example, Vinuya
et al., in their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization” v. The Honorable
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo et al., G.R. No. 162230 (Apr. 28, 2010); Vinuya et
al., in their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization” v. The Honorable
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo et al., G.R. No. 162230 (Aug. 13, 2014).
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B. Disconnect Between Brothels and the Forced Sex Stations
The preceding discussion has shown that a contractual process is not
relevant to the coercive and deceitful recruitment for military sexual servitude at issue here. There is a clear disconnect between prewar prostitution
and forced sexual slavery because the victims of the sexual slavery did not
have a choice to engage in contract negotiations. Moreover, as we detail below, it is possible that Japan may have strategically recruited a large number
of young Korean women to weaken the morale of Koreans who did not wel48
come Japanese rule and to undermine its national and cultural identities.
Thus, while it is possible that, as Ramseyer contends, some women at some
stations, particularly in the early stages of the war, may have managed to
49
avoid the atrocities described in the testimonies above, for the vast majority, what occurred was sexual servitude through coercion or deceit.
The author’s failure to acknowledge the presence of such sexual servitude is grossly inappropriate as it subsumes the large number of victims of
sexual slavery under the author’s description of willing sex workers who
negotiated for money. The article makes this flawed connection between the
practices of private brothels and the forced sex stations because it fails to
acknowledge that the recruitment of the victims was carried out in a systematic and coordinated way involving private operators, members of the police, the military, schools, and local authorities to meet the increasing military demand for sexual services. The author contends that concern for
venereal disease was the reason for setting up the forced sex stations (“com50
fort stations”). Although there was such a concern, it was the increasing
rapes by Japanese military personnel and the resulting loss of military discipline that led to the establishment of these stations throughout the front51
lines. This meant that the Japanese military required a large number of individuals providing sexual service for the military, a demand on a scale that

48.
The Period of Wartime Mandatory Draft Through Elimination of Ethnicity, NAT’L
INST. KOREAN HIST., http://contents.history.go.kr/mobile/nh/view.do?levelId=nh_047_0020_
0030_0010_0030 [https://perma.cc/RF5S-CYN9] (in Korean). Rape has been used as political
means of subjugation and even genocide. See, e.g., Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a
Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the
Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348 (1998); Jennifer L. Green, Uncovering Collective
Rape: A Comparative Study of Political Sexual Violence, 34 INT’L J. SOC. 97 (2004); Sherrie
L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 350 (2003); Rachel
A. Sitkin, Bandy X. Lee & Grace Lee, To Destroy a People: Sexual Violence as a Form of
Genocide in the Conflicts of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Chile, 46 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV.
219 (2019); Catherine A. Mackinnon, Genocide’s Sexuality, 46 POL. EXCL. & DOMIN. 313
(2005); Shayna Rogers, Sexual Violence or Rape as a Constituent Act of Genocide: Lessons
from The Ad Hoc Tribunals and a Prescription for the International Criminal Court, 48 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 265 (2016).
49.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
50.
Ramseyer, supra note supra note 1, at 4.
51.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 5; Argibay, supra note 15, at 376–77
(2003); TANAKA, supra note 5, at 10–11.
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could not be met by willing individuals, to suppress cases of rape that would
undermine military discipline and increase resistance from local residents in
occupied territories.
Another possible motive–weakening the Korean morale and undermining of its cultural and national identities–renders the practices of private
brothels even more irrelevant to the forced sex stations, going beyond recruiting individuals who would offer sexual services as in brothels. By putting so many Korean women into sexual slavery, the Japanese military
caused not only extreme mental trauma but also substantial reproductive issues among many victims due to venereal diseases and the infliction of oth52
er physical violence. The Japanese authorities, who had closely monitored
the stations on frontlines, could not have been unaware of the critical effect
that brutal sexual servitude had on the large group of Korean women victims. As a result, the organized, large-scale sexual slavery of Korean women
can be construed as an act of oppression intended to subjugate Korean peo53
54
ple, who did not welcome Japanese rule in the Korean peninsula, especially when viewed in conjunction with other oppressive measures that the
Japanese government had adopted to suppress the morale of Korean people
55
and eliminate their national and cultural identities.
The sexual slavery perpetrated by Japan was a crime against humani56
ty. The system of sexual slavery breached the 1921 International Conven52.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 7; see also Amnesty International Report,
supra note 6, at 13.
53.
See supra note 48 (discussing rapes used as a political means of subjugation and
genocide).
54.
Koreans initiated a nation-wide, peaceful protest for independence on March 1,
1919 (“March 1 Movement”) and continued their struggle to obtain independence from Japan.
Koreans also set up a provisional government in Shanghai, China, in April of 1919. See
HENRY CHUNG, THE CASE OF KOREA: A COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE ON THE JAPANESE
DOMINATION OF KOREA, AND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREAN INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT (2014).
55.
For example, the Japanese adopted policies to ban Korean language in schools,
compelled the change of Korean names into Japanese, and mobilized Koreans for war efforts
in the forms of forced labor, sexual slavery, and the military draft. See Soh, supra note 28, at
1228. Ramseyer incorrectly states that Koreans were not drafted into the Japanese army, even
though Korea was part of the Japanese nation. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 7. Korea was never
a legitimate part of the Japanese nation; Japan forcibly annexed Korea in 1910; thus, Korea
was under Japanese occupation. Also, Koreans were subject to the military draft beginning in
1944. Brandon Palmer, Imperial Japan’s Preparations to Conscript Koreans as Soldiers,
1942—1945, 31 KOREAN STUD. 63 (2007).
56.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 155;
McDougall Report, supra note 7, at 18–19; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at
21–22. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines crimes
against humanity as:
[A]ny of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamen-
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tion for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (Japan rati57
fied this treaty in 1925) and norms of customary international law which
were subsequently enshrined in the 1948 Convention of the Prevention and
58
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”). The
Coomaraswamy Report introduces a view that the sexual slavery enforced
by Japan was “carried out with intent to destroy a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group, causing bodily or mental harm to members of
the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life to bring
about its physical destruction and imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group, constituting genocide in accordance with article II
59
of the Genocide Convention.”
Japan has objected to this argument, contending that these instruments,
the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of
60
War Victims, did not exist during the Second World War. However, it is
widely acknowledged that these treaties codified existing norms of custom61
ary international law. Similarly, it has been recognized that prior to the
tal rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of
apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force July 1, 2002, art. 7
[hereinafter “Rome Statute”].
57.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 12; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 157; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 19–20; Argibay, supra note 15, at 375.
58.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 12.
59.
Id. at 13; see also The Period of Wartime Mandatory Draft Through Elimination of
Ethnicity, supra note 48.
60.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16.
61.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations affirmed this principle in 1993. He
stated:
In the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle nullum crime
sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the
problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not
arise [. . .] The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in
armed conflict as embodied in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the
Protection of War Victims: the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907;
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9
December 1948; and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August
1945.
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war, sexual slavery was understood to be a violation of customary interna62
tional law.
The political and legal dimensions of sexual slavery indicate that the rationale that may exist for private brothels would have little or no relevance
to the circumstances of the enforced sex stations, affirming the disconnect
between prewar prostitution and sexual slavery. As such, the author’s examination of the contractual dynamics of private brothels does not offer any
understanding or insight into the operation of military sexual service during
the war.

III. Brutality in the Forced Sex Station (“Comfort Station”)
A. Mistreatment, Torture, and Killing
The Ramseyer article describes the forced sex station as an agreeable
workplace where sexual services were rendered for stipulated terms and
63
promised pay. It adds that the girls were able to save their pay, although
some station owners may have “cheated” their prostitutes, and the author
also introduces an episode of a “comfort woman” who became popular and
64
was satisfied with earnings that had not been available to her at home. As
sources of these stories, the article appears to rely on controversial accounts
of Koreans published in Japan advocating that military sexual servitude was
65
a legitimate service.
However, more comprehensive investigative reports detail horrendous
66
conditions at the forced sex stations. Based on the testimonies of the victims forced to work at the stations, the reports conclude that the conditions
67
under which they served the soldiers were almost invariably appalling. The
quality of their accommodation and general treatment may have varied, but

U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, ¶¶ 34–35, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). In support of the position that Japan’s sexual slavery is a war crime, in December 1996, the United States Justice
Department, without disclosing names, put sixteen Japanese involved with comfort women
and Unit 731, which was linked to biological warfare in China, on a list of war criminals and
barred them from entering the country. Wakabayashi, supra note 7, at 228.
62.
See also Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16; Rule 93. Rape and Other
Forms of Sexual Violence, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org
/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93, [https://perma.cc/66HS-49UL].
63.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6–7.
64.
Id. at 6.
65.
See KILSUNG CHOE, THE TRUTH ABOUT COMFORT WOMEN, AS SEEN BY A
KOREAN RECEPTIONIST (2017); YU-HA PARK, COMFORT WOMEN OF THE EMPIRE (2014).
66.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7,
48–50; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 11–13.
67.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7,
48–50; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 11–13.
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68

almost all survivors testified to harshness and cruelty. The accommodations were generally poor, consisting of tents or temporary wooden shacks
in frontline positions, often with only mattresses on the floor, exposed to
69
unhealthy cold and damp conditions. In relatively safer locations, the victims had rooms in one or two-story buildings, but these were no more than
cramped, narrow cubicles, as small as three by five feet, space barely suffi70
cient for a bed.
The victims also faced severe restrictions on their freedom of movement. Ramseyer’s article states that “even overseas, women who disliked
71
their jobs at a brothel could – and did – simply disappear.” However, this
could not be further from the truth in regard to the forced sex stations. The
sites were usually patrolled and guarded by barbed wire fences, and the
women’s movements were closely monitored and restricted. It was the life
of a prisoner – many survivors testified that they were never allowed to
72
leave the camp or were only allowed to walk outside at set times. Some of
them could make occasional trips to have their hair cut or even to see a film,
but the victims were under strict control and monitoring; escape, which
73
would have resulted in severe punishment, was nearly impossible.
These young women were subjected to inhumane treatment: They were
74
required to submit to as many as sixty to seventy men per day and were
abused, tortured, and even killed by soldiers and officers who often ignored
75
regulations. Health checks were carried out regularly, primarily to prevent
the spread of venereal diseases, but little notice or care was given to the frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones that
76
solders inflicted on their victims. Their cruel treatment, which would have
surely deterred anyone else from applying for the job, is another indication
that there was indeed no contractual process but, instead, coercion and de77
ception in recruitment.

68.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 7,
48–50; Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 11–13.
69.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 47.
70.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 15, 48.
71.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6–7.
72.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50;
Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13.
73.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50;
Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13.
74.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
75.
Id. at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50; Amnesty International Report,
supra note 6, at 10–13.
76.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also ICJ Report, supra note 6, at 50;
Amnesty International Report, supra note 6, at 10–13.
77.
See also Stanley et al., supra note 16; Cho, supra note 16.

Winter 2021]

The Fallacy of Contract in Sexual Slavery

307

The young women were supposed to be paid for their “services,” as the
78
author contends, but the vast majority never saw any of the money that
79
they had been promised. Such non-payment would obviously deter any future transactions with willing individuals, but the military would not have
been concerned with that. Military officials did not rely on any contractual
process, but rather on deception and coercion, compelling Korean women to
comply to avoid a severe punishment or even death to themselves or their
family members. The author asserts that women could be “unpleasant” to
80
avoid demands on them, but in a place where they were subject to rampant
violence and savagery, such a response surely would have risked harsh pun81
ishment or even death, as the following testimony by Ju Hwang Kim, a
survivor who served at one of the stations, illustrates:
I thought I was drafted as a labour worker when, at the age of 17,
the Japanese village leader’s wife ordered all unmarried Korean
girls to go to work at a Japanese military factory. I worked there for
three years, until the day that I was asked to follow a Japanese soldier into his tent. He told me to take my clothes off. I resisted because I was so scared, I was still a virgin. But he just ripped my
skirt and cut my underwear from my body with a gun which had a
knife attached to it. At that point I fainted. And when I woke up
again, I was covered with a blanket but there was blood everywhere.
From then on, I realized that during the first year I, like all the other
Korean girls with me, was ordered to service high-ranking officials,
and as time passed, and as we were more and more ‘used’, we
served lower-ranking officers. If a woman got a disease, she usually
vanished. We were also given ‘606-shots’ so that we would not get
pregnant or that any pregnancies would result in miscarriage.
We only received clothes two times per year and not enough food,
only rice cakes and water. I was never paid for my ‘services’. I
worked for five years as a ‘comfort woman’, but all my life I suffered from it. My intestines are mostly removed because they were
infected so many times, I have not been able to have intercourse
because of the painful and shameful experiences. I cannot drink
milk or fruit juices without feeling sick because it reminds me too
82
much of those dirty things they made me do.

78.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6–7.
79.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
80.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
81.
“Yet some women still tried to refuse being made sexual slaves. Their resistance
was met by force, often by torture, in order to get their consent, and some were maimed or
killed.” TANAKA, supra note 5, at 50.
82.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
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A testimony of another survivor, Ok Sun Chung, vividly illustrates the
point that nothing short of absolute obedience ensured their survival:
[. . .] I was taken to the Japanese army garrison barracks in Heysan
City. There were around 400 other Korean young girls with me and
we had to serve over 5,000 Japanese soldiers as sex slaves every
day – up to 40 men per day. Each time I protested, they hit me or
stuffed rags in my mouth. One held a matchstick to my private
parts until I obeyed him. My private parts were oozing with blood.
One Korean girl who was with us once demanded why we had to
serve so many, up to 40, men per day. To punish her for her questioning, the Japanese company commander Yamamoto ordered her
to be beaten with a sword. While we were watching, they took off
her clothes, tied her legs and hands and rolled her over a board with
nails until the nails were covered with blood and pieces of her
flesh. In the end, they cut off her head. Another Japanese, Yamamoto, told us that “it’s easy to kill you all, easier than killing dogs”.
He also said “since those Korean girls are crying because they have
not eaten, boil the human flesh and make them eat it”.
One Korean girl caught a venereal disease from being raped so often and, as a result, over fifty Japanese soldiers were infected. In
order to stop the disease from spreading and to “sterilize” the Kore83
an girl, they stuck a hot iron bar in her private parts.
As these testimonies illustrate, the young women in the forced sex stations established by and for the Japanese military were subjected to horrific
violations of their most basic human rights. Clearly, they were not participating in any form of voluntary employment.

B. Lasting Wounds
The preceding discussion reveals the extent of cruelty and mistreatment
that young women had to endure at the forced sex stations. It was the life of
a slave in the worst possible form where the concepts that the author entertains, such as contract or contractual reward, had absolutely no relevance.
The episode of a content Korean “comfort woman” introduced by the Ramseyer article, who enjoyed her popularity, savings, and shopping opportuni84
ties in town, and the diametrically opposite testimonies of the horrific experiences introduced in this article might suggest that we are discussing
wholly separate events. However, the testimonies offered by a large number
of survivors are consistent in their descriptions of the brutality. The horrible
suffering reported by the victims is also consistent with that reported by Al-

83.
84.

Id. at 9.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6.
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lied soldiers captured by the Japanese army during the war. In short, the
mistreatment reported by the victims, as horrific as it may be, is consistent
86
with the abusive conduct of the Japanese military during the war.
It has been over seventy-five years since the end of the war, but the
wounds inflicted by sexual enslavement on a massive scale continue with
the few survivors of the tragedy still alive today and with many others who
share their pain. Long after the war, survivors continued to suffer from extreme trauma and physical pain resulting from sexual abuse. For example, a
survivor was exposed to numerous venereal diseases when serving as a military sexual slave, and as a result her son was born after the war with a men87
tal disability. In the conservative Korean culture where sexuality was not a
subject of public discussion, survivors also endured a deeply entrenched
88
sense of shame, which is one of the reasons that their testimonies were not
made public until the 1990s, by which time Korean society had become
more open and ready to acknowledge the wounds of the past.
Memories of the horrific past are not the only source of the wounds. Attempts to deny responsibility for the atrocities and to rewrite history, such as
the one advanced by Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War, aggravate the
wounds, and this is the reason that we felt compelled to write this article.
The Japanese government offered the Kono Statement in 1993, in which it
admitted the involvement of the Japanese military and administration in the
recruitment and management of the forced sex stations and acknowledged
that the victims “lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmos89
phere.” The Japanese acknowledgment was not complete, as it did not admit its legal responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Kono Statement, which the
Ramseyer article never mentions, was a move in the right direction, one
which could have opened a pathway to the healing of wounds and the beginning of reconciliation.
However, the Japanese government did not stay the course. As more
conservative factions subsequently took power, the political environment in
Japan favored the denunciation of war-related responsibilities. Thus, for example, in 2014, the Japanese government demanded that the United Nations
90
amend the Coomaraswamy Report, but this demand was rejected. Japan
85.
See, e.g., Liz Bestic, The Japanese Torture of My Father Was Horrific — So Why
Are They Considering Watering Down the Apology for Their Wartime Past?, INDEPENDENT
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/japanese-torture-my-fatherwas-horrific-so-why-are-they-considering-watering-down-apology-their-wartime-past10074720.html.
86.
Id.
87.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 7. Amnesty International also reports that
nearly all Korean survivors that they met had been unable to have children due to internal injuries caused by mass rape, or as a result of contracting STDs which went untreated. Amnesty
International Report, supra note 6, at 13.
88.
See also Soh, supra note 28, at 1230.
89.
Kono Statement, supra note 9.
90.
Panda, supra note 21.
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subsequently offered an official apology for the pain and suffering inflicted
on the victims in the name of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as a part of a
91
2015 Korea-Japan Agreement on “Comfort Women.” Opposition to this
Agreement arose in Korea based on Japan’s failure to admit its legal liabili92
ties. Nonetheless, the Japanese government still has the opportunity to
seek reconciliatory solutions to heal the wounds. The Coomaraswamy Report, over two decades ago, recommended that the Japanese government accept legal responsibility for violating its obligations under international law
by establishing and managing the forced sex stations and make full disclosure of the documents and materials in its possession with regard to the sta93
tions and other related activities. We believe that this is a necessary dimension of the healing process.
Lastly, we wish to point out that the denial of responsibility by the Japanese government is not the only source of these lasting wounds. Some
members of the conservative factions in Japanese society, as well as their
collaborators in Japan and overseas, have issued statements and published
materials, mischaracterizing the victims, as the Ramseyer article has done,
94
as willing sex workers. Attacks on victims, personal and otherwise, have
95
been made to discredit their testimonies. Episodes of women who were
supposedly better treated at the stations have been introduced and emphasized, as the Ramseyer article has also done, without any qualification, as if
such stories in fact represented the general state of the stations. Tragically,
mischaracterizations, falsifications, and insults exacerbate the harm that has
96
been done.

91.
Yuki Tatsumi, Japan, South Korea Reach Agreement on ‘Comfort Women,
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 28, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japan-south-korea-reachagreement-on-comfort-women/.
92.
Misato Nagakawa & Trevor P. Kennedy, Public Divided over ‘Comfort Women’
Agreement, E. ASIA F. (Jan. 22, 2016),
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/22/public-divided-over-comfort-women-agreement/.
93.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 22.
94.
See supra note 65 (listing examples of such authors).
95.
The Coomaraswamy Report observes that some rejected the testimonies of the victims as “anecdotal or even created to implicate the Government in a matter which was essentially a private and, therefore, a privately run, system of prostitution” (emphasis added). Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 4. Additionally, Japanese civil society groups, such as the
Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, have made public statements and submissions
to the United Nations accusing the victims of lying and calling them “crooks.” Letter dated
May 27, 2020 from the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform to the U.N. addressed
to the Secretary-General, A Deceitful Korean Citizens’ Group (NGO) and the Comfort Women Issue, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/NGO/X (May 2020), http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL
/Deceitfule.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D4E-7RGX].
96.
Thus, Ramseyer’s article has provoked intense protests and objections, not only in
Korea, but across the United States and within his own institution. Scholars such as Yuji Hosaka (Sejong University), Carter J. Eckert (Harvard University), Alexis Dudden (University of
Connecticut), Pyong Gap Min (City University of New York), Noah R. Feldman (Harvard
Law School), and Katharine H.S. Moon (Wellesley College) have raised objections to his ar-
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IV. Fallacy of Contract Arguments
A. Defects in Arguments
1. Flawed Application of Game Theory
The Ramseyer article attempts to explain “the contract dynamics” of the
transactions between prostitutes and brothel owners which, it claims, “reflected the straightforward logic of the credible commitments so basic to el97
ementary game theory.” According to the article, the unique features of
these transactions that cannot be found in other industries – such as large
advances made to prostitutes or their families (e.g., parents), higher incomes
conditional upon compliance with the incentive structure (i.e., higher pay
for a greater number of customers served), fixed duration (with an option to
quit early upon generation of sufficient revenue) – are integral parts of the
contractual dynamics that can be explained by game theory: The women
demanded a large portion of their pay upfront with knowledge that the
brothel owners had an incentive to exaggerate their future earnings, and the
owners demanded a contractual structure that gave women incentives to
98
work hard, knowing they would be inclined to shirk.
This is a flawed application of game theory that fits the realities of neither prostitution “contracts” in Japan and elsewhere that the article refer99
ences, nor military sexual servitude during the war. Game theory is the
study of the ways in which individual choices are made in expectation of the
100
choices of others to produce an optimal outcome. As such, the key presumption of game theory is that the actors have choices regarding their
courses of action. Thus, game theory would not be applicable, and the contract dynamics the author purports to have existed would not stand, unless
the women and brothel owners had agency concerning their own actions.
Such choice did not exist for women involved in a large number of socalled prostitution “contracts” in Japan and elsewhere or for the victims of
sexual slavery who were either forced into sexual servitude or induced by
guments for being defective and incorrect. Ariel H. Kim & Simon J. Levien, Harvard Professor’s Paper Claiming ‘Comfort Women’ in Imperial Japan Were Voluntarily Employed Stokes
International Controversy, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 6, 2021), https://www.thecrimson.com
/article/2021/2/7/hls-paper-international-controversy/ [https://perma.cc/2AD6-2KYK]; see
also Dudden, supra note 43.
97.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
98.
Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the economic considerations surrounding
prostitution, see Peter G. Moffatt, Economics of Prostitution, in ECONOMICS UNCUT: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO LIFE, DEATH, AND MISADVENTURE 193, 202–11 (Simon W. Bowmaker
ed., 2005).
99.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2–5.
100.
John Nash first developed game theory in the 1950s. John Nash, The Bargaining
Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950), cited in Yong-Shik Lee, Reconciling RTAs with the
WTO Multilateral Trading System: Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Development Facilitation, 45 J. WORLD TRADE, 625, 639 (2011).
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deception (e.g., on promises of non-sexual jobs). With respect to the prewar
prostitution that the Ramseyer article describes, a number of young girls
were “sold” by their families to brothels, without having a chance to review
the terms of their “contracts” and understand them properly, if there was
such a contract, not to mention having a chance to decide their courses of
101
action in expectation of the actions to be taken by brothel owners. An episode of a ten-year-old “deciding” to enter prostitution, which the author
102
cites as an example of bargaining, is tragic – if such episode were to be
true – and it does not support the argument that women chose to work as
prostitutes. In addition to the obvious moral issues involving a child con103
senting to prostitution, it is widely accepted that one may not bind minors
104
under contract.
Some young women may have acquiesced and even agreed to go to
brothels in response to the lure of better food, clothing, the glamours of the
city, or the opportunity to help their family, but they were hardly the active
negotiators that game theory presupposes. The victims of sexual slavery
during the Second World War who were recruited by force or deception
were obviously not in a position to negotiate anything regarding the terms of
the “contract”; thus, game theory does not explain such circumstances. At
most, game theory is arguably applicable only to a relatively small number
of cases in which adult individuals willing to provide sexual services were
in a position to negotiate in expectation of the actions of the brothel owners.
This simply was not the case for the victims of sexual slavery or for a large
105
number of prewar sex workers. Rather, their exploitation illustrates how
women in occupied territories were used to further Japanese military objectives.

2. Not a Fair Contract but One to Exploit
Even if one were to accept that there were willing individuals who had
the opportunity to negotiate, the resulting contracts would not have been
fair. Harvard law professor Noah R. Feldman recounts that “[t]he economic
relationship that was deployed, even according to Ramseyer’s own research,
106
is very close to what we would ordinarily call debt slavery.” Professor
Feldman draws parallels between the Japanese context and sharecropping
contracts in the Jim Crow American South, noting the extent to which such

101.
MIKISO HANE, PEASANTS, REBELS, AND OUTCASTES: THE UNDERSIDE OF
MODERN JAPAN 207 (1982).
102.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
103.
The author recounts that the minimum age for licensed prostitutes in Japan was
eighteen. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2.
104.
See supra note 23 (explaining the rule of contract law that one may not bind a minor under contract).
105.
HANE, supra note 101.
106.
Kim & Levien, supra note 96.
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arrangements were designed to exploit and actually did exploit the vast
107
power discrepancy between actors and institutions.
At the conclusion of the Civil War, slavery was abolished but very few
formerly enslaved African Americans were able to own land. Most had little
choice but to enter into sharecropping contracts with landlords – former
plantation owners – under which they agreed to raise cash crops and give a
high portion of their harvests, usually fifty percent, to the landowners in exchange for use of the land (often twenty to fifty acre plots suitable for farming by a single family, into which landowners had divided plantations), as
well as a cabin and supplies. These contracts created a system of economic
dependency and poverty for sharecroppers: Landowners extended credit to
sharecroppers to buy goods and charged high interest rates, sometimes as
108
high as seventy percent a year. Sharecropping contracts were thus a device of exploitation – a form of debt slavery – across the American South.
The prostitution contracts discussed in the Ramseyer article have a
similarly exploitative structure: Women “choosing” to work in prostitution
received a large sum up front, according to the author, but it was a loan, and
the women were required to work off the loan in a form of indentured servitude. The author describes them as “a multi-year indenture agreement that
bundled an up-front advance, additional cash compensation, a maximum
term, and the right to quit working early if a woman generated enough reve109
nue.” In this arrangement, most of the revenue generated by the women
would be taken by brothel owners, who claimed their own share (as high as
two-thirds to three-quarters of the revenue according to the author), their
loan repayment (sixty percent of the remainder), and the cost of food and
110
accommodation.
As Professor Feldman explains, it was a system of exploitation, rather
111
than a fair contract. He opines that game theory should account for the
way “contracts” between people of vastly different power can increase pow112
er differentials and reduce people to the status of debt slavery, but Ramseyer failed to show this outcome in his analysis. Loaning a family more
money than it could ever pay back is an effective tool for forcing the fami113
ly’s daughter to continue doing coerced sex work. In other words, the
form of the “contract” is itself a means of coercion. When an employment

107.
Id.
108.
Isham G. Bailey, Sharecropper Contract, 1867, GILDER LEHRMAN INST.
AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/spotlight-primary-source/share
cropper-contract-1867 (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
109.
Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1.
110.
Id. at 2.
111.
Kim & Levien, supra note 96.
112.
Correspondence on file with the lead author.
113.
Id.
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contract does not allow for the employee to stop working (until the employ114
er is ready to let the employee go), that relationship is one of enslavement.

B. Unfeasibility of Contractual Recruitment
Ramseyer’s contractual approach fails to explain the conditions of military sexual servitude during the Second World War. It is unrealistic to think
that any person would freely accept such a contract. The author underestimates the massive risks and dangers that a woman would have had to accept
to provide sexual services on the frontlines during the war and the size of
the reward that would have had to be offered, should any women have been
inclined to agree to such a contract. Yet he writes:
For these short but potentially dangerous assignments, the brothels
paid (annual) wages much higher than those at the Tokyo brothels.
Typically, for the two-year job they paid several hundred yen upfront. Sample contracts for Japanese women recruited to Shanghai
comfort stations in 1937 provided advances of 500 to 1,000 yen
(Naimusho, 1938). Similarly, Home Ministry documents from 1938
report Japanese women travelling to the Shanghai comfort stations
on 600–700 yen advances, with one woman receiving an advance
in the 700-800 yen range, and two in the 300-500 yen range (Naimusho, 1938).
Note what this means: in compensation for the much higher risks
involved, prostitutes at the comfort stations earned much higher
pay. Domestic prostitutes in Korea and Japan already earned considerably more than they would earn in other employment. Recall
that those in Japan earned 1000 yen to 1200 yen on six year terms.

114.
The circumstances under which Korean “comfort women” were exploited in World
War II also would meet the definition of “trafficking in persons.” See Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing
the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/49 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter “Trafficking Protocol”]. The Trafficking
Protocol defines human trafficking as:
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or other services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
Id. art. 3(a). Although the Trafficking Protocol was adopted in 2000, international law prohibited human trafficking prior to World War II. See infra note 120.
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At the comfort stations prostitutes from Japan earned 600-700 yen
115
on two year terms.
The amount of compensation offered in the early stages of the war may
have been higher than the contemporary earnings available in Japan (which
by no means affirms the existence of a contract for women who were forced
or deceived), but it would have been extremely difficult to recruit on the
same terms in the later stages of the war where hostilities intensified and the
dangers on the frontlines were heightened. These dangers would have included not only injury or death from the typical conditions of battlefields,
such as bombing, gunfire, physical assaults by enemies, disease, and food
poisoning, but also the acts of Japanese soldiers. There were frequent instances of soldiers and officials ignoring regulations, trying to stay longer
with the victims and often inflicting physical injury on them (e.g., cigarette
burns, bruises, bayonet stab wounds, and even broken bones, as described
116
above).
There were no assurances against the occurrence of such brutality for
anyone serving at the frontline stations. Considering the extent of the danger, the cost of recruitment of willing individuals would have been prohibitively high as the war intensified; advances would have had to be high
enough to be worth risking death in a treacherous place far away from
home. In such circumstances, it simply would not have been feasible to recruit a sufficient number of individuals to offer sexual services on the frontlines by a contractual process. Prostitutes, according to the author’s account,
already making higher wages than those engaged other trades in their home
countries, would have little incentive to take such enormous risks.
Thus, a non-contractual method was necessary: Just as a draft was necessary to forcibly recruit men to fight on the frontlines, a “draft” was also
necessary to meet the Japanese military’s requirement for sexual services
where very few, if any, would have willingly volunteered (even for purported strong compensation) due to the extreme dangers of the intensifying war.
This explains why violent and atrocious methods were used to recruit victims from Korea and elsewhere. The author’s contract approach is no more
than a fallacy that relies on underestimating the dangers of the intensifying
war and on the false presumption that the majority of those who offered
sexual services on the frontline had an opportunity to negotiate the terms of

115.
116.

Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 6.
Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 6.
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117

their contracts. Not surprisingly, no one has been able to locate any proof
118
of the existence of such contract with “comfort women” to date.

V. Human Rights Implications
The sexual slavery perpetrated by the Japanese military during the Second World War is among the most atrocious wartime human rights violations of the twentieth century. As many as 200,000 women from Korea and
119
other occupied countries were exploited, and they suffered a breadth of
harm including inhumane treatment, torture, and, in some cases, even death.
The victims were recruited by force or deception, with the involvement of
the Japanese military or government. The Japanese military was involved
with the management of the “comfort stations” and thus was responsible for
the atrocities committed therein. The resulting wounds from these human
rights violations remained with the survivors, their families, and many others who share their pain even to this day.
As discussed earlier, the conduct of the Japanese military in the recruitment and the management of the “comfort women” system violated international human rights law, including the 1921 International Convention
120
for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, and was inconsistent with principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law later enshrined in the Geneva Conventions for the Pro121
tection of War Victims and the Genocide Convention, respectively. Japan
has denied legal responsibility, noting that the Genocide Convention and
122
Geneva Conventions did not yet exist during the Second World War.
However, this contention does not relieve Japan of liability under international law, because the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions
117.
Katharine H.S. Moon, a professor of Asian studies and political science at Wellesley College, also states that Ramseyer’s claim ignores the context in which women entered
into contracts. She questions how we may “explain whether a 14- or 16-year-old girl knew
what she was signing even if she signed it, especially in a Korean society at the time that was
not accustomed to contracts and related legalism and didn’t grant such agency to girls and
women.” Kim & Levien, supra note 96.
118.
Stanley et al., supra note 16; see, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gersen, Seeking the True Story
of the Comfort Women: How a Harvard Professor’s Dubious Scholarship Reignited a History
of Mistrust Between South Korea and Japan, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/seeking-the-true-story-of-the-comfortwomen-j-mark-ramseyer.
119.
CUMINGS, supra note 29, at 155; SOH supra note 5, at 15; ICJ Report, supra note 6,
at 7; YOSHIAKI, supra note 5, at 93; H.R. 759, 109th Cong. (2006).
120.
See 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women
and Children, Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415; see also International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83, entered
into force 18 July 1905; International Convention for the Suppression of the “White Slave
Traffic,” May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. T.S. 45, 1912 GR. Brit. T.S. No. 20.
121.
See discussion supra Section I.B.
122.
See also Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16.
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123

codified existing norms of customary international law, and sexual slavery
124
was understood to be a violation of customary international law.
It is also worth noting a 1998 ruling by a Japanese court (the Shimonoseki Branch of the Yamaguchi District Court) that the comfort women system constituted discrimination based on gender and ethnicity and that the
system violated the Japanese Constitution’s guarantee that “[a]ll of the peo125
ple shall be respected as individuals.” While the court did not specifically
rule that the Japanese government violated international law, it is significant
that the Japanese court affirmed the breach of fundamental human rights
caused by the military’s practice of sexual slavery.
The Japanese government has continuing obligations to acknowledge
and provide redress to the women who were coerced into participating in
this system of sexual slavery and to their families. These obligations are
enumerated in the “Basic Principles and Guidelines” on redress for violations of the most serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law,
126
promulgated by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005. They recognize that
victims and survivors must be treated with respect and dignity, accorded ac127
cess to justice, and provided “adequate, effective and prompt reparation.”
In addition to measures of restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation,
those subjected to gross violations of human rights and serious violations of
humanitarian law—as the women at issue here were—are entitled to redress
that takes less tangible forms. These include, but are not limited to,
“[v]erification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth,” “[a]n
official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation
and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim,” a “[p]ublic apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility,” and the “[i]nclusion of an accurate account of
128
the violations that occurred” in educational materials. These are steps that
the Japanese government can still take, measures that would provide a belated but nonetheless highly significant indication of respect for international human rights and international humanitarian law. By contrast, the rewrit123.
Wakabayashi, supra note 7, at 228.
124.
See Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 7, at 16; see also Rome Statute, supra note
56, art. 7. Prohibitions on sexual servitude, trafficking, and slavery have also been codified in
other subsequent international law. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, art. 6, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46),
at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force, Sept. 3, 1981; Trafficking Protocol, supra note
114, art. 3.
125.
Kim & Kim, supra note 11, at 263 n.3; see also discussion of the Japanese court
case, supra note 11.
126.
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (16 Dec. 2005).
127.
Id. arts. VI, VII.
128.
Id. art. IX secs. 22(b), (d), (e), (h).
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ing of history to erase the experiences of the women subjected to sexual
slavery undermines this process and denies them even this modicum of re129
spect for their humanity.
Disregarding the extensive factual record and applicable human rights
and humanitarian law, Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War mischaracterizes sexual slavery as a legitimate contractual arrangement whereby women
freely participated in contract negotiations and received greater rewards for
accepting the dangers of life on the frontline, completely ignoring voluminous evidence to the contrary. As discussed above, the victims did not have
such a choice. When force was used to secure their recruitment, disobedience meant severe punishment, including death, to themselves or their family members, as testified to by a number of survivors. Once they arrived at
the stations, they lived as enslaved persons under harsh conditions, deprived
of their freedom, dignity, and life as human beings. Many of the young
women, most only fourteen to eighteen years of age, did not make it back
130
home. (According to one study, ninety percent did not survive the war.)
131
Contracts were never a part of this cruel process.

VI. Conclusion
We believe that the mischaracterization of history in the Ramseyer article fits squarely within a long line of attempts to deny the existence of wartime atrocities and rewrite history. Realizing this danger, the Kono Statement made the following commitment:
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history.
We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same
mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through
132
the study and teaching of history.
Had the Japanese government implemented this resolve, teaching history as it truly occurred and affirming its position domestically and overseas,
there would have been an opportunity for these wounds to heal, at least to
some extent. If such efforts had been made, perhaps we would not have to
face ongoing efforts to recharacterize and erase exploitation – a process that
inflicts additional injury on the victims and survivors and on all of us who
share their pain.
Unfortunately, subsequent conservative Japanese administrations, such
as that of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, retreated from this resolve,
129.
While beyond the scope of this article, we note that similar practices aimed at rewriting history and erasing human rights violations occur in other contexts, and that any such
efforts to suppress the truth of human rights atrocities must be resisted.
130.
Blakemore, supra note 22.
131.
See Stanley et al., supra note 16; Cho, supra note 16.
132.
Kono Statement, supra note 9.
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and reconciliation is now further away. We believe that we have a moral obligation to recognize truth in history and counter attempts to disrespect the
most sacred aspects of human rights – freedom, dignity, and life – which are
implicated in the question of sexual enslavement. We write this article in an
effort to remedy the injustice caused by Contracting for Sex in the Pacific
War’s distortion of history, to the modest extent possible in our capacity as
academics.

